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Abstract 
This study evaluates the performance of the eight most important Swedish domestic forecasters of real GDP-growth, CPI-
inflation and unemployment for the sample period 1993-2001. The evaluation is based on the following measures: mean 
absolute error, the root mean square error, bias and finally directional accuracy.  The forecasts are even compared to naive 
random walk and random walk with drift models. The results indicate that the current forecasts compared to the year ahead 
forecasts decline over the forecasting horizons as more information becomes available. The results with respect to the 
directional accuracy indicate that we are equally good/bad in predicting the directional accuracy for all three macro 
aggregates. According to the comparisons with the naive random walk model six out of seven Swedish CPI-inflation 
forecasters were outperformed by the naive random walk model. Tests of bias indicate that the Swedish forecasters 
underestimate GDP-growth and overestimate CPI-inflation and the unemployment rate for the sample period. All the 
Swedish forecasters have been successful in predicting the downward trend in CPI-inflation and the unemployment rate. The 
performance of the Swedish domestic forecasters is better using preliminary GDP-growth outcomes than final. The 
performance for the current year forecasts is better than the year ahead forecasts for all three macro economic variables. 
Revisions are positively biased.  
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1. Introduction  
The main purpose of most macroeconomic forecast is as an aid to the rational discussion of economic 
and policy decision-making. Forecasts of economic variables are important because Governments plan 
budgets and set macroeconomic policies based on forecasts of future economic activity e.g. money, 
stock and foreign exchange markets, consumption and investments. Three principles underpin 
forecasting and they are as follows: (1). There are regularities to capture. (2). Such regularities are 
informative about the future and finally (3). That there exists a method of capturing them (see Chatfield 
(1996), Clements and Hendry (1994) and Granger (1996)).    
  
There are many reasons for studying the accuracy of the economic forecasts, including the need to: (1). 
Identify the sources and thereby the causes of major mistakes, in order to learn from them. (2). To form 
a rational basis for assessing what kind of policy the accuracy of forecasts typically permits policy 
makers to make. (3). To be able to recognize in advance the occasion when there is a conjunction of the 
sort of circumstances that typically lead to large forecasting errors. (See Liewelly and Arai in OECD 
Studies, 1984). 
 
The National Institute of Economic Research (NIER) periodically reviews its forecasting record as the 
OECD Secretariat and other National institutes do. Earlier Swedish studies on evaluation of forecasting 
accuracy in Sweden are Kim (1988), Carling and Kim (1989), Rosenberg (1992), Pernodd (1995), 
Bergström (1995), Borg (1996), Öller (1996). The earlier studies concentrated on evaluating and 
comparing accuracy of forecasts in the domestic context with respect to the Theil inequality coefficient 
(Theil’s U) and other measures such as estimating the confidence intervals for forecasts for important 
macroeconomic variables (see Borg (1996)). However no international comparisons of forecasts were 
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made in earlier studies on forecasting evaluation.  
 
In the international context a number of studies have tested a set of projections by generating a battery 
of diagnostic statistics or by comparing these with naive or mechanical extrapolation (see Clements and 
Hendry (1997)). Öller and Barot (1998), Öller and Barot (1999) and finally Öller and Barot (2000), 
concentrated on comparing the OECD Secretariat's GDP-growth and inflation forecasts  with that of  
the European government agencies forecasts. The main results of this study where that overall, inflation 
forecasts were significantly more accurate than growth forecasts, and in contrast to growth forecasts, 
they generally improved over time. 
 
Recently Blix et al. (2001, 2002) have evaluated the forecasts for the Swedish economy for the period 
1993-2001 using standard statistical measures of forecast error such as the mean prediction error (MPE) 
and root mean square error (RMSE). A model to capture the potential herd behaviour is used in their 
study. The overall results from this study indicate that there is a downward bias both for the current 
year and the next year GDP-growth forecasts. The CPI-inflation forecasts have considerable systematic 
error, and most forecasters have on the average overestimated inflation during the period 1993-2001. In 
addition the Ministry of Finance has systematically under estimated unemployment. 
 
 In contrast to Blix et al.we even look at the directional accuracy which deserves attention and compare 
the forecasts with both the naive random walk and random walk with drift models. In addition we 
calculate the mean absolute and the root mean square error of revisions an aspect neglected in the above 
mentioned study. The GDP-growth forecasts are evaluated both using final respective preliminary 
outcomes in order to highlighten the important aspect of revisions. We explicitly define the forecast 
occasions (spring, summer, autumn and December) that are under scrutinization.  
 
2. The main objective of this study 
The main objective of this study is to focus on the major Swedish forecasters. The choice of the 
Swedish forecasters is based on the availability and timing of forecasts for the period 1993 – 2001. The 
project was initiated at NIER was limited to merely three central important variables namely GDP-
growth, CPI-inflation and unemployment rate. The Swedish forecasters that are under scrutinization 
are: the National Institute of Economic Research (NIER), Ministry of Finance (FD), the Confederation 
of Swedish Enterprise (IF), the Swedish Research Institute of Trade (HUI), The Central Bank Sweden 
(RB), the SEB (SE) group, the Handelsbanken (HB), and finally Merita Nordbanken (NB).  
 
This study assesses the projections of the three most important economic variable GDP-growth, CPI-
inflation and unemployment with respect to statistical measures of forecasting accuracy: mean absolute 
error (MAE), the root-mean squared error (RMSE) and finally directional accuracy (DA). In contrast to 
Blix et al. we find it appropriate to use the GDP outcomes from Old National Accounts (1993-1998) in 
order to evaluate the GDP-growth forecasts
2. The main reason for using the Old National Accounts 
(1993-1998) is that most of the forecasts were conducted under the Old system of National Accounts. In 
addition MAE and RMSE of revisions for the GDP-outcomes are calculated. We even look at the 
directional accuracy of the forecasts and bias. Forecasting accuracy is compared to naive models using 
Theil U (1966) and Theil W index (see Kennedy (1969)) which was neglected in the above mentioned 
studies. In contrast to Blix et al. we focus on merely three central variables in this particular study, 
namely GDP-growth, CPI-inflation, and unemployment which was outlined in this project at NIER.  
 
This type of diagnosis would provide us with valuable insights which may perhaps improve our future 
forecasts.  In addition it will give us, and other forecasting institutes, an insight into how we stand in 
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our comparisons with other domestic forecasters. It is a fallacy to suppose that there is some single 
objective test for deciding upon the accuracy of a forecast. Any kind of post - mortem must be made 
with certain questions in mind. In this particular study we assess the accuracy of both past and recent 
projections by quantifying the average errors that were made.We explicitly address the following 
questions:   
(1). Has MAE and RMSE for GDP-growth, CPI-inflation and unemployment (UNP) declined over 
time from spring, summer, autumn to the December forecasts? (i.e. some type of convergence). 
(2). Have the GDP-growth, CPI-inflation, and UNP forecasts been able to predict directional 
accuracy correctly? (i.e. acceleration/decelerations in GDP-growth, CPI-inflation and UNP 
developments which deserves attention). 
(3). Have the GDP-growth, CPI-inflation and the UNP forecasts been better than so called naive 
method of forecasting such as always predicting forecasts generated by a naive no-change time 
series model and a naive average growth model? 
(4). Have the GDP-growth, CPI-inflation and the UNP forecasts been biased tending to 
systematically under predict or over predict? 
 
In the process of evaluating the accuracy of the Swedish forecaster’s projections, it must be kept in 
mind that they are not purely model-based numbers though model may play an important role in their 
elaboration. The final forecast could be a combination of judgemental and model based forecast. In 
addition it is important to bear two policy aspects related to the forecasting in mind:  
 
(I). The Swedish forecaster’s projections are generally based on the assumption of broadly unchanged 
policies. Two of the forecasters to fall in this category are the Ministry of Finance, Sweden and the 
National Institute of Economic Research, Sweden. 
(II). The Swedish Central Banks inflation forecasts are based on the assumption of an unchanged repo-
rate. In order to make a fair comparison one has to adjust CPI-inflation for this assumption. We refrain 
from comparing the accuracy of the Swedish Central Banks inflation forecasts in this paper.  
 
However the limitations of this exercise should be noted. It merely applies statistical tests below in 
order to assess the accuracy of the projections (described below). (Neither does it go beyond to assess 
the reasons why the errors were made). Anyway one can mention in passing that the main source of 
errors are likely to be found in erroneous assumptions concerning key economic variables, 
unanticipated changes in policies and the behaviour of economic agents and data revisions (see 
Economic Outlook (1993) and Öller and Barot ). 
 
This study is organised in the following sections. Section 3 describes the data, the time horizon, defines 
the variables, and the Swedish forecasters coverage. In Section 4 the specific procedures employed in 
order to evaluate the forecasting accuracy of the projections are discussed. Section 5 presents the results 
with respect to the different measures. Finally Section 6 concludes.  
 
3.  Data          
The present study covers the period (1993-2001) and deals exclusively with annual forecasts which 
seem to be the most relevant for policy decision-making process. The measurement studied is limited to 
the assements of three key macroeconomic indicators: GDP-growth measured by the change in real 
gross domestic product (GDP), CPI-inflation-measured by the yearly change in consumer price index 
(CPI-inflation), and finally the unemployment rate defined as percentage of the labour force. The 
choice of the forecasters as well as the variables under scrutinization has been conditional by the 
accessibility of data and the timing of the forecasts. These variables are selected for their obvious 
importance and because both projection and outcome data for them tend to be available. We have  
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chosen to evaluate the forecasters who conduct forecasts not so far away in time
3. Table 1 easily 
facilitates learning of the names of the Swedish forecasters who are under scrutinization and the 
average week of the publication of their forecasts.  
 




Average week of the forecast: 
spring, summer, autumn, December 
National Institute of Economic Research  (NIER)   13, 25, 36, 49 
Ministry of Finance Sweden (FD)  16, NA, 40, NA 
Swedish Confederation of Professional (IF)   18, 23, 39,48 
Swedish Research Institute of Trade (HUI)  11, 22, 37, 49 
The Central Bank of Sweden (RB)  12, 23,42, 49 
The Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken (SE)  14, 22, 38, 49 
Handelsbanken (HB)  17, 21, 36, 47 
Merita Nord Banken (NB).  15, 24, 37, 47 
Note: The average week of the forecast is calculated as the mean of the weeks that the forecasts are published.  
 
This information in Table 1 indicates that HUI and RB conduct their forecasts earlier than NIER, 
followed by SE Banken, Merita Nordbanken, the Ministry of Finance, Handelsbanken and IF. The later 
one conducts ones forecast implies more information is available to be potentially utilized for the later 
forecaster to conduct their forecast. Hence any information that is publicly available could be 
incorporated in the later forecaster’s projection. This implies that one can use a model to test if the later 
forecasters use the information available from earlier forecasters (see Romer and Romer (1996)). We 
refrain form this aspect mainly due to the limited number of observations and degrees of freedom. In 
addition we can address the question as suggested by the editor of the Brussels Economic Review if the 
timing of the forecast coincides with the availability of key new information. According to Blix et al. 
forecasters use large number of sources and different data sets when they conduct their forecasters. In 
addition big forecasters like NIER and the Central Bank have large man power resources compared to 
Handelsbanken or the Swedish Research Institute of Trade. More resources allocated to the forecasting 
activity should imply better forecasting accuracy.   
 
We classify our spring, summer, autumn and December forecasts in the following manner. The spring 
forecasts are the forecasts conducted under the first (18) weeks from the beginning of the year. The 
summer and autumn forecasts are the forecasts conducted during weeks (19-31), and weeks (32-44) 
respectively. Lastly the December forecasts are the forecasts that are published during weeks (45-52). 
Hence we evaluate four forecasts per year for the period 1993-2001. 
 
For particular years some institutes have not conducted a forecast and hence there are missing 
observations. In order to fill up the missing observations we have taken the mean of two earliest 
available forecasts for the particular institution under scrutinization and for that particular quarter 
concerned. We have in this manner taken the mean of (the first and the third quarter) for the GDP-
growth, CPI-inflation and unemployment forecasts for NIER in order to fill up the second quarters of 
1993, 1994 and 1999. Apparently no forecasts were conducted for the year 1999 as the National 
Accounts were in a phase of transition from Old to New National Accounts. Similarly the mean has 
been taken in order to fill missing observations for the Swedish Confederation of Professional (IF) for 
one of the quarter’s specific for the year 1994. The same method has been applied to fill the missing 
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forecasts for NB for the second quarter of 1993. SE bank has missing observations for the second 
quarter of 1994 and 1997 and hence the same procedure has been applied. Due to unavailability of CPI-
inflation and unemployment forecasts from the Swedish Central Bank for the period 1993-1996 we 
merely evaluate their GDP-growth forecasts as it covers the sample period of this study. The Ministry  
of Finance conducts forecasts on the Swedish economy merely two times a year in spring and autumn 
and hence I do not evaluate their summer respective December forecasts.  
 
GDP-growth final outcomes are the outcomes recorded in the National Accounts appearing two year 
after the period covered by the forecast e.g. the 1993 "outcome" is that reported in 1995. As most of the 
forecasts were made in the Old system of National Accounts we use the GDP-growth outcomes from 
the Old system of  National Accounts from 1993-1998 but the new from 1999-2001 (see Öller and 
Hansson 2005 for the GDP-growth statistics from the Old National Accounts). The New system of 
National accounts was introduced in 1999. There have been some sectorial definitional changes in the 
new system and revisions of National Accounts. According to Gust et al. (2001), the switch to the New 
National Accounts raises both the level and growth rates of GDP relative to the Old system (by about 
one percentage point for Sweden). 
 
The Swedish forecasts are thus the current GDP-growth forecasts at time (t) and GDP-growth a year 
ahead projections at time (t+1). The GDP realizations refer to the period (t+2). The forecasts are the 
spring, summer, autumn and December forecasts respectively for the current (t) and a year ahead (t+1). 
The GDP-growth, CPI-inflation and the unemployment forecasts have been collected from several 
numbers of the respective forecasters own publications (see references for the names of the publications 
for Swedish forecasters).  
 
The definition of the actual outcome for a given period in the past is by no means straightforward. 
Large successive revisions of the National Accounts, which often occur a considerable time after the 
publications of the first preliminary estimates, can make definitions of "outcome" rather difficult and to 
some extent arbitrary. In addition a different kind of problem arises in so far as the "actual" change in 
GDP-growth is seldom, if ever known unambiguously. The problem of data revisions is insoluble with 
the reservation for CPI-inflation (i.e. there is a law in Sweden which prohibits revision of CPI-inflation. 
Such aspects as revisions with combination of measurements errors are always present in context of 
forecasting. We have tried to compare the forecasts which more or less made in the same time period. It 
is of considerable importance to bear in mind that the outcome and forecast figures are defined in the 
same unit of measurement. This implies that outcomes are not gathered too far away in time from the 
forecast time - point (see Bergström (1995) for more elaborations). 
 
4.  Statistical measures for judging the accuracy of projections 
4.1. The mean error, the average absolute error and root mean square error 
Our main focus on assessing forecasting accuracy is based on the following three statistical measures: 
the mean error or bias (ME), the average absolute forecast error (MAE), the root - mean squared error 
(RMSE), which describes the dispersion of the forecast error around zero, and finally the Theil U 
(1966) statistic. The simplest of measures is to compute the mean error or bias (ME) or mean absolute 
error (MAE).   
 
ME is computed as: 
 
                                                                           (1)  
    
         
) t A   -   t (P  
n
1
  =    ME ∑       
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where: P denotes the forecast and A is the outcome. ME indicate whether systematic over - or under 
prediction is present. This measure is equivalent to (4) described later. MAE directly measures 
forecast accuracy and is computed as follows:  
 
                   (2) 
                             
 
This is the average of all the differences between forecast and actual values, disregarding the sign of the 
error. Hence a forecast that was 1% too low (a bias of +1%) and another that was 1% too high (a bias of 
1%) would both represent absolute errors of 1%. The shortcomings of (1) and (2) error measures are 
that they give no special weight to large errors as is implied, for instance by quadratic loss function (the 
concept of quadratic loss function is broadly that the loss due to the prediction error is proportional to 
the square of the error) and that they take no account of the inherent variability of the series). RMSE 
implicitly assumes that the seriousness of any error in arises sharply with square of the size of the error, 
so that an error of ± 2% is treated as four times (
2 2 ) as important as an error of ± 1%. It must be 
pointed out that large errors influence RMSE more than MAE because of squaring of the errors and is 
computed with the formula below 
 




Efficiency and lack of bias are desirable properties of projection errors. A projection is described 
unbiased if its average error over time is zero. The test for bias involves checking the statistical 
significance of the coefficient from a regression of the projection errors on a constant see equation (4). 
The null hypothesis is that  α   should have a zero value. In case α is significant it indicates bias. Bias 
can be interpreted as optimism or pessimism while conducting the forecast.  
 
                 (4) 
 
In equation (4), 
t e  equals the forecast error and 
t ε   the regression error and finally K  denotes the 
constant. The forecast average bias is defined as the average difference between the forecast and the 
actual value of each variable. A positive value for bias indicates that on average the whole run of 
forecast for a particular variable, the actual value was over estimated, so that the forecasts were too 
high. A negative bias indicates that on average the actual were too high. If the estimated  α   which is 
the average forecast error is negative and significant, a negative bias exists. Analogously we calculate 
bias for revisions. The results indicate that on the average the bias is of the magnitude 0.4, implying 
that the preliminary GDP-growth outcome is revised upwards for the period 1993-2001.  
 
4.3. Directional accuracy 
The analysis of directional accuracy scrutinizes whether or not the variable being projected actually 
moved in the same direction relative to its value in year t-1. It should be mentioned that that the size of 
the error is not considered under this test. However it would be of utmost interest to know whether a 
target variable such as CPI-inflation, for example moves in the intended direction. In order to 
operationlize the concepts of acceleration and deceleration, we look at the accuracy of direction of 
| t A t P |    
n
1
  =    MAE − ∑  
2 ) t A   -   t (P  
n
1   =   RMSE   ∑   
t   +   K    =   t e    ε α ) (  
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forecast for the current period to the next period and the actual of the current period to the actual of the 





A t P t P                                                                                             (5) 
 






A t A A                                     (6) 
where A is the first available actual value. If  t P  and  1 − t A  have opposite signs, an acceleration 
deceleration is missed. If  t P and  1 − t A  have the same sign, acceleration/deceleration is predicted. 
Similarly, there is, or is not, an acceleration/ deceleration actual turning point depending on whether  t A  
and  1 − t A  have the same signs. There are four different qualitatively different outcomes, two correct and 
two incorrect. The outcome is defined to be correct if both  P  and A have the same signs, or if both are 
either positive or negative. The outcome is considered incorrect if P and A take on different signs (see 
Beach et al. 2002).  
 
The formula to obtain the percentage of correct forecasts is as follows: 
 
outcomes total of number
sign same forecasts correct of number
forecasts correct
) (
% =         (7)
  
 
For each variable studied, the number of each of the four possible pairings of projections and outcome 
direction of change is tallied; this information is then used to construct a test of null hypothesis of 
independence (lack of a relationship) between the direction of projected and actual change. This 
hypothesis is not tested in this study. 
 
4.4. Naive forecasts 
The Theil U (seeTheil (1966)) is a measure of the degree to which one time series ( t X ) differs from 
another ( t Y ). Hence Theil-statistic is the ratio of RMSE of the forecast by a particular institute to the 
RMSE of the random walk forecast (naive no change forecast). The ratio of Theil U for the particular 
institute to that of the naive model is then computed. The naive model utilized assumes that the growth 
rate in the year t equals the growth rate in the previous year i.e. gdp-growth t = gdp-growth t-1. The U 
measure has the following properties: (1). 0 < U < ∞, as forecasting errors grow. (2). U = 0, when 
forecast are perfect i.e. all Pt = At. (3).  U > 1, if a set of forecasts has an inequality coefficient U which 
approaches or is greater than 1 then it is clearly fairly poor (i.e. the forecast has on average wrong 
direction). With perfect forecasting, P = A, and U  therefore zero. As forecasting errors grow, U rises 
and has no upper bounds. Theil's inequality measure (U) accomplishes two things. It scales the RMSE 
by the variability of the underlying data, and it offers a way of evaluating forecasting performance 
relative to a ”naive” forecast of no change in the growth rate between t-1 and t. A Theil’s U of less than 
1 is said to beat the naive forecast. A RMSE error can be divided also with the average variation (taking 
an average of the series) to obtain a V measure, which compares forecast to average of the actual 
variable. A V measure is usually more stringent criterion of accuracy than a U, because the average of 
economic variables deviates from zero. This is equivalent to the ‘random walk with drift’ naive 
alternative. This question amounts to a comparison of the accuracy of the Swedish forecasters with the 
performance of a 'naive forecaster' who, regardless of the state of the economy, always predicted the  
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average rate of change of GDP-growth (see Dean (1976) and Kennedy (1969)). Here it is assumed, for 
convenience, that the naive forecaster knew in advance what the average would be. Dividing the RMSE 
by the average of the actual would give us the Theil’s V.This makes the yardstick of comparisons more 
realistic rather than assuming a 'completely naive model'. It is a well established fact that certain 
economic variables are more erratic than others, and thus should be difficult to predict. The 
computation of standard deviation indicates whether the variability in the GDP-growth variable is large 
or small. In case a strong trend is present, a large standard deviation need not imply that the series is 
irregular and difficult to predict.  
 
5. Results 
5.1. GDP-growth forecasts 
In Tables 2 and Table 3 below we present the accuracy of the GDP-growth forecasts with respect to 
both the final and the preliminary outcomes of GDP-growth from the Old National Accounts. The 
results indicate that both MAE and RMSE for the current year forecast declines over time from the 
march to the December forecast irrespective if one uses preliminary or final outcomes, for all the 
forecasters with the exception for NIER. Nevertheless the results from both MAE and RMSE (see 
Table 3 and Table 5) indicate that the Swedish forecasters have easier to deal with the preliminary 
outcomes rather than final outcomes. The shortcomings of MAE error measure is that no special weight 
is given to large errors. Calculating the MAE and RMSE of revision errors defined as the difference 
between the final and the preliminary outcomes comes to 0.43 and 0.59 for the current period and 0.48 
and 0.62 for the forecast for the next year. The forecasts conducted in Sweden by the forecasting 
institutions are to a large extent based on the actual prevailing at the time when the forecasts are 
conducted and the availability of new information which is based on surveys and leading indicators.  In 
this context the revisions do de facto play a significant role. The magnitude of revision is reported in 
Table 2, column 6.  
 
Table 2. MAE: Spring / Summer Autumn / December. GDP-growth (t).  
Final outcomes: Old National Accounts 1993-2001 












  0.44 0.60 0.43 
FD 0.87
  NA 0.52  NA  0.43 
HUI 1.16
  1.03  0.76 0.61 0.43 
IF 1.22
  1.02  0.80 0.72 0.43 
SE 1.02
  0.80  0.64 0.33 0.43 
NB 1.03
  1.06  0.74 0.56 0.43 
RB  1.06 0.96 0.60  0.58  0.43 
HB  1.24 0.99 0.72  0.53  0.43 
Avg.  1.06 0.95 0.65  0.56  0.43 
Note: NA indicates not available.  A MAE revision is defined as the difference between the final and preliminary  
outcome. Avg. denotes the average which is the mean of MAE. 
 
Comparing the results of this study with Öller and Barot (1980-1998) in order to get a longer historical 
perspective the MAE for the current year GDP-growth forecasts was 0.8, 0.6 and 0.6 for NIER’s spring, 
autumn and December forecasts. This has the implication that with respect to GDP-growth forecasts, 
that NIER has de facto decreased and than increased its MAE marginally for the spring and autumn 
forecast respectively. The calculated MAE value remains unchanged for the December forecast (see 
Table 2, columns 2, 4, and 5). The results with respect to RMSE using final respective preliminary 
outcomes are presented in Table 4 and Table 5. 
Table 3. MAE: Spring / Summer / Autumn / December. GDP-growth (t).  
Preliminary outcomes: Old National Accounts 1993-2001  
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NIER 0.57  0.40  0.39  0.41 
FD 0.59  NA  0.40  NA 
HUI 0.77  0.69  0.41  0.38 
IF 0.79 0.59 0.39  0.33 
SE 0.70  0.52 0.39  0.28 
NB 0.67  0.67  0.44  0.30 
RB 0.71  0.57  0.26  0.28 
HB 0.72  0.64  0.42  0.34 
Avg.  0.72 0.58 0.39  0.33 
Note: NA indicates not available. Avg. denotes the average which is the mean of MAE. 
 
The increase in MAE in the December forecasts is due to revisions of the preliminary actual. It must be 
pointed out that NIER’s MAE, increases during the December forecast. This can be due to the first 
revisions of GDP-growth are published in December which could have totally changed the picture how 
the economy would evolve in the last quarter. For all the other forecasters MAE decreases on the 
average as we reach the end of the forecasting round in December, hence the last quarter of the year. 
The computed forecasting errors indicate that the situation is almost identical when we analyze the 
forecasting performance utilizing preliminary data.      
 
Table 4. RMSE: Spring / Summer/ Autumn / December. GDP-growth (t).  
Final outcomes: Old National Accounts 1993-2001  











  0.87 0.52  0.75 0.59 
FD  1.11  NA 0.56  NA 0.59 
HUI  1.29  1.21 0.88  0.77 0.59 
IF  1.49  1.16 1.00  0.80 0.59 
SE  1.23  0.95 0.78  0.46 0.59 
NB  1.30  1.23 1.02  0.76 0.59 
RB  1.23  1.09 0.76  0.71 0.59 
HB  1.41  1.16 0.82  0.57 0.59 
Avg. 1.28  1.10  0.79  0.69   
Note: NA indicates not available. Avg. denotes the average which is the mean of RMSE. 
 
RMSE is of importance as it shows the size of average prediction, error, ignores the direction, but gives 
greater weight to large errors. The RMSE for the current year forecast suggests a pattern similar to the 
MAE such that the Swedish forecasters find the preliminary figures easier to deal with than the final 
ones. There is a tendency for RMSE for the current forecasts to decline over the forecast horizon on the 
average with the reservation for NIER and HUI (see Table 4 and Table 5).  
 
The standard deviation of the preliminary GDP-growth output growth is 1.8, which is less than the final 
outcome growth figure of 2.07. This implies that it would be easier to forecast with preliminary than 
final outcomes are less volatile. The RMSE of revisions is reported in Table 4, column 6. The results 
indicate that NIER’s December forecasts are poor compared to the spring, summer and autumn 
forecasts. In the ranking NIER seems to lose its predominant position during the December forecasts.  
 
Table 5. RMSE: Spring / Summer / Autumn / December. GDP-growth (t).  
Preliminary outcomes: Old National Accounts 1993-2001  
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NIER 0.80  0.48  0.47  0.55 
FD 0.79  NA  0.44  NA 
HUI 0.93  0.84  0.50  0.55 
IF 1.02 0.65 0.47  0.38 
SE 0.89  0.62 0.47  0.36 
NB 0.92  0.81  0.54  0.35 
RB 0.85  0.70  0.32  0.30 
HB 1.15  0.79  0.52  0.40 
Avg. 0.92  0.70  0.47  0.41 
Note: NA indicates not available. Avg. denotes the average which is the mean of RMSE. 
 
The MAE and RMSE results for GDP-growth a year ahead forecasts using both preliminary and final 
outcomes are reported in Tables 6, Tables 7, Tables 8 and Table 9. The results indicate with respect to 
both the measures that the errors do not decline over time as more information becomes available. 
There is systematic pattern in the December forecast specifically with respect to increases in the error. 
It should be pointed out that one would expect the forecasting errors to decrease as more information 
becomes available.  This issue needs further scrutinization and analyses as it is an important finding of 
this study. The MAE and RMSE of revisions for the one year ahead forecasts are reported in Table 6, 
column 6, and Table 8, column 6. Calculating simple correlations between the revisions and the 




Comparing the results of this study with  Öller and Barot (2000), in order to get a longer historical 
perspective the MAE for the  year  ahead GDP-growth forecast MAE for the period 1980-1998 (for 
spring only from1990), autumn and December a year ahead forecasts were 1.5, 1.1 respective 0.9. 
Comparing these results with the one in Table 6 for NIER indicates marginal improvement for the 
march forecast, unchanged magnitude of MAE for the autumn forecast, and substantial deterioration for 
the December forecasts. The MAE and RMSE results for one year a head forecasts in Table 8 and Table 
9 indicates once again that similar to the current forecasts that it is easier to forecast with preliminary 
GDP-growth outcomes than using the final outcomes. The standard deviation of the GDP-growth final 
outcomes is 2.07 while GDP-growth preliminary is 1.80 for the current period and is 1.25 and 1.04 
respectively for the period 1994-2001. The final outcomes are more volatile than the preliminary ones. 
Both Tables 8 and Table 9 indicate with respect to RMSE that as more information becomes available 
the RMSE increases systematically for most of the Swedish forecasters with the exception of NB and 
HB (see Table 9), where it remains unchanged. This seems to be strange as we would expect the errors 
to decrease as more information becomes available, as mentioned earlier. RMSE in Table 8 and Table 9 
for all the Swedish forecasters increases as more information becomes available. This indicates that 
there is a tendency to some type of flock behavior (keeping up with the Jones). In addition we are 
inclined to believe that the Swedish forecasters seem to be using the same information set. The RMSE  
of revisions is reported in Table 8, column 6. The Swedish forecasters have difficulties dealing with a 
year ahead GDP-growth forecasts. The performance using preliminary GDP-growth figures is better 
than the final ones, even for the year ahead projections. This implies that the forecasters have some 
problems with the magnitude of revisions.  
 
Table 6. MAE: Spring / Summer/ Autumn / December. GDP- growth (t+1).  
                                                 
4. A positive correlation indicates that the variables move in the same direction, while a negative correlation implies that 





Final outcomes: Old National Accounts 1994-2001 










NIER  1.36  1.10 1.05 1.26 0.48 
FD 1.23  NA 1.06 NA 0.48 
HUI 1.44  1.43 1.19 1.28 0.48 
IF  1.53  1.65 1.40 1.51 0.48 
SE 1.33  1.10 1.06 1.15 0.48 
NB 1.13  0.95 1.04 1.06 0.48 
RB 1.16  1.09 1.10 1.26 0.48 
HB 1.49  1.36 1.30 1.35 0.48 
Avg. 1.33  1.24  1.15  1.27   
Note: NA indicates not available. Avg. denotes the average which is the mean of MAE. 
 
Table 7. MAE: Spring / Summer / Autumn / December. GDP-growth (t+1). 
Preliminary outcomes: Old National Accounts 1994-2001 








NIER 0.99  0.75  0.73  0.89 
FD 0.85  NA  0.84  NA 
HUI 1.06  1.03  0.86  0.95 
IF 1.33  1.23  0.98  1.04 
SE 0.90  0.73  0.79  0.88 
NB 0.98  0.80  0.84  0.74 
RB 0.86  0.71  0.70  0.84 
HB 1.11  1.01  1.00  1.03 
Avg. 1.01  0.89  0.84  0.91 
Note: NA indicates not available. Avg. denotes the average which is the mean of MAE. 
 
Table 8. RMSE: Spring / Summer / Autumn / December. GDP-growth (t+1).  
Final outcomes: Old National Accounts 1994-2001 










NIER  1.49 1.30 1.29 1.45 0.62 
FD 1.36 NA 1.25 NA 0.62 
HUI 1.57 1.52 1.45 1.54 0.62 
IF  1.76 1.82 1.65 1.77 0.62 
SE  1.51 1.40 1.29 1.40 0.62 
NB 1.28 1.10 1.29 1.36 0.62 
RB  1.30 1.25 1.32 1.47 0.62 
HB 1.67 1.68 1.63 1.63 0.62 
Avg. 1.49 1.44 1.40 1.52   
Note: NA indicates not available. Avg. denotes the average which is the mean of RMSE. 
 
 
This study indicates that revisions are an important aspect that the Swedish forecasters should take into 
consideration. Many policy-makers both in the private and the public sector use the information 
contained in the GDP-growth forecast. It is of utmost importance that the Swedish forecasters are able 
to incorporate the aspects of revisions in their forecasts realialising the fact that a preliminary figure  
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gets revised and becomes final. The aspects of revisions make decision-and policy making uncertain. In 
many circumstances, this sort of uncertainty leads to policy caution-smaller moves in interest rates than 
would be suggested by looking simply at the forecast and ignoring uncertainty.  
 
Table 9. RMSE: Spring / Summer / Autumn / December. GDP-growth (t+1). 
 Preliminary outcomes: Old National Accounts 1994-2001 








NIER  1.17 1.00 1.01 1.10 
FD  1.05 NA 1.08 NA 
HUI  1.28 1.23 1.19 1.26 
IF  1.43 1.34 1.17 1.26 
SE  1.06 1.03 1.01 1.13 
NB  1.17 0.99 1.09 1.09 
RB  1.12 1.04 1.10 1.22 
HB  1.36 1.34 1.32 1.38 
Avg.  1.21 1.14 1.12 1.21 
Note: NA indicates not available. Avg. denotes the average which is the mean of MAE. 
 
Hence we conclude that forecasts cannot be simply accepted at face value by policy-makers. Instead the 
policy makers must be informed by the forecasts, by the discussion around the forecasts and the forces 
the forecasters see at work in producing them. In case the final GDP figures would give a totally 
different view of the economy in comparisons to the preliminary one the investment decisions made 
would not be optimal. This would imply loss of profits for the firm. Hence revisions may be considered 
a measure of the price, in terms of accuracy (see Öller and Hansson (2003) for more elaborations). As 
regards policy the first point which comes to mind is that the tendency of the GDP-growth forecasts is 
towards underprediction rather than overprediction, so that policy recommendations based upon them 
would be biased in the direction of overexpansion.    
     
5.2. CPI-inflation forecasts 
The accuracy of the CPI-inflation forecasts is presented with respect to MAE and RMSE for the current 
and one year ahead forecasts in Tables 10 and Table 12 and Tables 11 and Table 13 respectively. The 
accuracy of CPI-inflation forecasts is much better than the GDP-growth forecast. A simple measure of 
volatility is the standard deviation. The standard deviation for the current and a year ahead forecasts for 
CPI-inflation are 1.45 and 1.01 and 2.07 and 1.25 for GDP-growth final outcomes indicating that 
inflation fluctuates less than final GDP-growth. Both the MAE and RMSE are lower for CPI-inflation 
than for GDP-growth, suggesting that it is easier to forecast CPI-inflation than GDP-growth (final 
outcome). CPI-inflation fluctuates less than GDP-growth. Hence both the MAE and RMSE are lower 
for CPI-inflation than for GDP-growth.  
 
Comparing the results of this study with Öller et al., NIER’s the current year, spring, autumn and 
December forecasts for CPI-inflation during the period 1980-1998, MAE was 0.7, 0.1 and 0.5 for the 
spring, autumn and December forecasts and a . Comparing the results with the one presented in Table 
10, there has been a marginal improvement in MAE for the spring, the autumn and the December 
current CPI-inflation forecasts. The CPI-inflation year ahead forecasts for spring, autumn and 
December forecasts during 1980 – 1998 had a MAE  1.7, 1.6, and 0.9 respectively. This implies that 
there has been considerable decrease in the magnitude of the errors for the spring and the autumn 
forecasts (see Table 12 NIER for comparisons) and a substantial improvement in the CPI-inflation 
forecasting accuracy. 
 












NIER 0.53  0.25  0.13  0.06 
FD 0.46  NA  0.12  NA 
HUI 0.82  0.39  0.30  0.12 
IF 0.71 0.44 0.32  0.12 
SE 0.58  0.35 0.07  0.17 
NB 0.69  0.41  0.18  0.16 
RB NA  NA  NA  NA 
HB 0.70  0.32  0.18  0.05 
Avg. 0.65  0.36  0.18  0.08 
Note: NA indicates not available. Avg. denotes the average which is the mean of MAE.  
 
Table 11. RMSE: Spring / Summer / Autumn / December. CPI-inflation (t),  
1993-2001 








NIER 0.63  0.32  0.18  0.11 
FD 0.56  NA  0.16  NA 
HUI 0.96  0.48  0.35  0.21 
IF 0.89  0.52  0.38  0.14 
SE 0.70  0.44  0.10  0.31 
NB 0.76  0.48  0.22  0.33 
RB NA  NA  NA  NA 
HB 0.88  0.43  0.23  0.08 
Avg. 0.78  0.44  0.23  0.14 
Note: NA indicates not available. Avg. denotes the average which is the mean of RMSE. 
 
The accuracy of the CPI-inflation forecasts is better with respect to both the accuracy measures since 
the introduction of a regime of inflation targeting in 1993 by the Swedish Central bank which implies 
that the consumer price index (CPI) has to be targeted to two per cent with a tolerated deviation interval 
of +/- 1 percentage points. The results do indicate that the downwards trend in CPI-inflation has been 
captured by most of Swedish forecasters. Current forecasts for both CPI-inflation reveal that both MAE 
and RMSE declines over time for most of the Swedish forecasters with the exception of SE and NB. 
The MAE and RMSE error for CPI-inflation for the year ahead forecasts (see Table 12) indicates that 
MAE declines for almost all the forecasters. As mentioned in the earlier the results that it is easier to 









Table 12. MAE: Spring / Summer / Autumn / December. CPI-inflation (t+1),  
1994-2001 
  MAE (t+1)  MAE (t+1)  MAE (t+1)  MAE (t+1)  
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(Spring) (Summer)  (Autumn)  (December) 
NIER 1.07
  0.77 0.83  0.62 
FD 0.95
  NA 0.79  NA 
HUI 1.19  0.96  0.93  0.79 
IF 1.06 1.09 1.10  0.74 
SE 1.19
  1.24 1.04  0.89 
NB 1.09
  1.07 1.12  0.82 
RB NA  NA  NA  NA 
HB 1.34  0.91  0.86  0.66 
Avg. 1.1  1.01  0.95  0.65 
Note: NA indicates not available. Avg. denotes the average which is the mean of MAE. 
 
Table 13. RMSE: Spring / Summer / Autumn / December. CPI-inflation (t+1),  
1994-2001 









  0.97 0.88 0.76 
FD 1.11
  NA 0.82 NA 
HUI 1.51
  1.13 0.94 0.86 
IF 1.27
  1.33 1.18 0.83 
SE 1.62  1.45 1.05 0.87 
NB 1.35
  1.30 1.09 0.89 
RB NA  NA  NA  NA 
HB 1.62
  1.31 0.96 0.79 
Avg. 1.28  1.13  1.11  1.00 
Note: NA indicates not available. Avg. denotes the average which is the mean of RMSE. 
 
5.3. Unemployment 
The unemployment variable actually has larger standard deviations than the GDP-growth and CPI-
inflation, and hence should be more difficult to forecast. Scrutinizing both MAE and RMSE by looking 
at Table 14 and Table 15, we see a tendency for the forecast errors for the current period to decline for 
almost all the forecasters. The results indicate convergence as expected.  
 
Analyzing the year ahead forecasts for the employment variable we observe that the MAE errors seem 
to decrease for the Swedish forecasters with the exception of IF, SE, HB and FD.  The same tendency is 
noticed for RMSE. RMSE declines for NIER, HUI, NB and HB. Larger forecasting errors were made 
during this period as result of a dramatic increase in the unemployment rate as a consequence of the 





Table 14.  MAE: Spring / Summer / Autumn / December. UNP (t), 1993-2001 










NIER 0.48  0.50  0.50  0.40 
FD 0.71  NA  0.50  NA 
HUI 0.70  0.57  0.50  0.41 
IF 0.72 0.59 0.52  0.46 
SE 0.66  0.51 0.44  0.43 
NB 0.78  0.51  0.52  0.40 
RB NA  NA  NA  NA 
HB 0.70  0.48  0.49  0.42 
Avg. 0.68  0.53  0.50  0.42 
Note: NA indicates not available. Avg. denotes the average which is the mean of MAE. 
 
Table 15. RMSE: Spring / Summer/ Autumn /December. UNP (t), 1993-2001 








NIER 0.65  0.70  0.69  0.59 
FD 0.82  NA  0.67  NA 
HUI 0.83  0.72  0.65  0.56 
IF 0.91  0.74  0.72  0.64 
SE 0.78  0.67  0.65  0.63 
NB 0.89  0.68  0.70  0.59 
RB NA  NA  NA  NA 
HB 0.95  0.66  0.70  0.63 
Avg. 0.83  0.70  0.68  0.61 
Note: NA indicates not available. Avg. denotes the average which is the mean of RMSE. 
 
Table 16. MAE: Spring / Summer / Autumn / December. UNP (t+1), 1994-2001 








NIER 0.94  0.74  0.75  0.55 
FD 0.66  NA  0.75  NA 
HUI 0.96  0.74  0.95  0.71 
IF 1.00 1.01 0.88  0.96 
SE 0.88  0.66 0.74  0.76 
NB 0.96  0.90  0.86  0.75 
RB NA  NA  NA  NA 
HB 0.78  0.85  0.71  0.74 
Avg  0.88 0.82 0.81  0.75 






Table 17. RMSE: Spring / Summer / Autumn / December. UNP (t+1), 1994-2001 








NIER 1.09  0.93  0.97  0.67  
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FD 0.88  NA  0.94  NA 
HUI 1.06  0.84  1.09  0.83 
IF 1.10  1.12  0.99  1.00 
SE 1.02  0.79  0.90  1.04 
NB 1.10  1.05  1.03  0.93 
RB NA  NA  NA  NA 
HB 0.88  0.87  0.83  0.82 
Avg. 1.03  0.93  0.96  0.88 
Note: NA indicates not available. Avg. denotes the average which is the mean of RMSE. 
 
The conclusions with respect to the numerical accuracy using MAE and RMSE for current and next 
years GDP-growth  forecasts indicates that the forecasting accuracy of Swedish forecasting  institutions 
is more accurate using preliminary outcomes than final outcomes. The reason may be mainly due to the 
fact that GDP-growth final outcomes are more volatile than preliminary. Adding the magnitude of 
revisions to the GDP-forecasts would improve the GDP-growth forecasting accuracy. The CPI-inflation 
current forecasts are more accurate than both the GDP-growth and the unemployment forecasts partly 
due to the fact that GDP-growth is more volatile than CPI.  However the year ahead unemployment 
forecasts are more accurate than CPI-inflation despite higher standard deviation for both current and a 
year ahead forecasts. The unemployment forecasts have better forecasting accuracy than GDP-growth 
forecasts. Forecasting accuracy is better for the current year forecasts than the year ahead forecasts for 
all the variables of the study. 
 
5.4. Directional accuracy of forecasts 
 
Leitch and Tanner (1995) suggest that the numerical accuracy measures (RMSE, MAE, MSE, e.g.) have 
little relevance for users of forecasts in business enterprises, who seem most concerned with the 
directional accuracy (acceleration/deceleration) indicated by the forecast. The main reason why the 
Private Business Sector scrutinizes growth forecasts is decide whether to invest in order to expand 
production capacity. If the investors receive the wrong signal, the results will be either a loss of market 
share or excess production capacity. In addition a central bank is interested in accurate inflation 
targeting. If it can predict whether the inflation rate will accelerate or decelerate, it will know whether 
and by how much to raise or lower the interest rates. The results of the directional accuracy of the 
Swedish forecasters with respect to GDP-growth are presented below. The directional forecasting 
accuracy evaluated using final outcomes is presented in Table 18 using the formula in (7).        
 
One is compelled to ask why certain years are difficult for the Swedish forecasters. It seems these years 
in particular seem to be the Swedish business cycle. In general the directional accuracy of the Swedish 
forecasters appears to be weak. The results with respect to directional accuracy using both final and 
preliminary outcomes indicates that there is not any significant difference in using preliminary 
respectively final GDP-growth outcomes. In particular one should notice that it is almost the same years 
that acceleration/deceleration in GDP-growth forecasts were missed. This in turn indicates that the 
Swedish forecasters have difficulties in dealing with directional accuracy. One can in fact ask the 
question why the years 1996, 1999 and 2000 were difficult to forecast. In contrast to the numerical 
accuracy which was more accurate with respect to preliminary data, we do not see any major 
differences or comparative advantage dealing with preliminary data.  
 
 
Table 18. Correct forecasts in percentages GDP-growth, CPI-inflation and  
UNP 1993-2001 
Ins. Spr  Sum  Aut. Dec.  Spr.  Sum  Aut  Dec  Spr  Sum.  Aut.  Dec. 





63 %  88 %  100 %  63 %  63 %  88 % 75 % 75 %  63 %  63 %  63 %  75 % 
FD  75 %  NA  75 %  NA  75 %  NA  75 % NA  63 %  NA  63 %  NA 
HUI  75 %  50 %  63 %  38 %  75 %  50 % 75 % 75 %  50 %  63 %  63 %  63 % 
IF  63 %  63 %  75 %  50 %  63 %  63 % 63 % 50 %  50 %  38 %  50 %  63 % 
SE  75 %  88 %  75 %  75 %  75 %  88 % 63 % 75 %  63 %  75 %  63 %  63 % 
NB  75 %  75 %  88 %  75 %  75 %  75 % 63 % 75 %  63 %  63 %  63 %  63 % 
RB  75 %  75 %  63 %  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA 
HB  75%  75% 75% 63%  75%  75%  63% 75%  75%  63%  50%  75% 
Note: NA indicates not available. We do not conduct the Pearson chi-square test due to the small sample size.  
Spr, Sum, Aut, and Dec denote spring, summer, autumn and December forecasts. 
 
The results of directional accuracy for the unemployment variable indicates that the Swedish 
forecasters missed 1994, 1995 and 1996, perhaps partly because the Swedish economy began to slide 
into recession in the 1990s. First escalating interest rates due to rising budget deficit and then rising 
unemployment. Prior to the crisis the unemployment rate had been fairly constant.  There was a 
structural break and hence difficult for the Swedish forecasters to predict the directional accuracy 
correctly. The only common years for the Swedish forecasters when both GDP-growth growth rate and 
unemployment rate were missed were 1996. The Swedish forecasters nevertheless have been fairly 
successful in forecasting the downward trends in the unemployment rate from 1997 to 2001. However 
the directional accuracy has been weak with respect to the years 1994, 1995, and 1996. In fact there 
was structural break in the unemployment variable (1990-1994) when unemployment dramatically 
increased from 4 to 12 percent.  
 
The results of directional accuracy with respect to CPI indicate that the years which are common to 
when acceleration respective deceleration were missed are 1996, 1998 and 1999. The target of the 
Central Swedish Bank is to limit the annual rate of increase in consumer prices to 2 percent, with a 
tolerance of 1 percentage point on either side. The development of inflation rate in Sweden is usually 
based on the relationship between growth and inflation. This is usually based on the so called Phillips –
curve model. For illustration purpose, (see the Swedish Economy, June 2002 pp. 66-67), in which the 
determination of the inflation rate is based on calculations of actual and potential output (which is an 
unobserved component and could be difficult to estimate). In case, the Swedish economy has a positive 
output gap due to rising resource utilization, this would lead to excessive increase in prices and wages. 
Perhaps the outlined model did not work for the years 1996, 1998, and 1999 could partly be due to the 
revision of GDP prelimnary outcomes.   
 
5.5. Naive comparisons of forecasts 
The results with respect to the Theil U index are presented in Table 19 for GDP-growth, Table 20 for 
CPI-inflation and Table 21 for unemployment. The interpretation of the coefficient is for example in 
Table 19 for NIER, U is 0.77 which indicates that the root mean square error of that set of predictions is 




Table 19. Theil U-index GDP-growth final  outcomes (t) and (t+1) 
Institute Spring  Sum  Autumn  December Spring  Sum  Autum Dec  
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(t) (t)  (t)  (t)  (t+1)  (t+1)  (t+1)  (t+1) 
NIER 0.77  0.57  0.34  0.49 0.87  0.76  0.76  0.85 
FD  0.72  NA  0.37 NA 0.80  NA  0.73  NA 
HUI 0.84  0.79  0.57  0.50  0.92  0.89  0.85  0.90 
IF 0.97  0.76  0.65  0.52  1.03*
  1.06*  0.96  1.03* 
SE 0.80  0.62  0.51  0.30  0.88  0.82  0.75  0.82 
NB 0.85  0.80  0.66  0.50 0.75  0.64  0.76  0.80 
RB 0.80  0.71  0.49  0.46  0.76  0.73  0.77  0.86 
HB 0.92  0.75  0.54  0.37 0.98  0.98  0.95  0.96 
Note: NA indicates not available. Figures in FET imply that the naive random walk model beats the forecast conducted by 
I.F. Spr. and Sum. Denotes spring respective summer forecasts. Asterisk * indicates that the naive random walk alternative is 
better. IF is the only Swedish forecaster that is beaten by the naïve alternative. 
 
The Theil Inequality Statistic (Theil U) is a measure of the degree to which the forecast differs from the 
actual. The naive model used assumes that the growth rate in the year equals the growth rate of the 
previous year. GDP-growtht = GDP-growtht-1 .With respect to GDP-growth it is only IF the only 
forecaster that is outperformed by the naive random walk counterpart. All of the Swedish forecasters 
outperform the Theil V index. The results are not reported here.  
 

















NIER 0.46  0.19  0.12  0.08 0.91  0.81  0.90  0.76 
FD  0.46  NA 0.13  NA  0.93 NA  0.83  NA 
HUI  0.72  0.35 0.26  0.16  1.26 0.95  0.94  0.86 
IF 0.46  0.39  0.28  0.10  1.07*
  1.11*  1.18*  0.83 
SE 0.52  0.31  0.07  0.18  1.35*  1.21*  1.05*  0.88 
NB 0.57  0.39  0.15  0.06  1.13*  1.08*  1.03*  0.89 
RB  NA  NA NA  NA  NA NA  NA  NA 
HB 0.66  0.32  0.17  0.17  1.30*  1.10*  0.96 0.79 
Note: NA indicates not available. For the CPI-inflation a year ahead forecasts the naive random walk model beats the 
forecast conducted by IF, SE, NB and HB. Spr. and Sum. denotes spring respective summer forecasts.  Asterisk * indicates 






Table 21. Theil U-index unemployment (t) and (t+1), 1993-2001 
Institute Spr  Sum  Autumn  December Spr Sum  Autumn  Decem  
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(t)  (t)  (t)  (t)  (t+1)  (t+1) (t+1) (t+1) 
NIER 0.25  0.28  0.27  0.23 0.44  0.37  0.39  0.27 
FD  0.32  NA 0.27  NA  0.35 NA  0.38  NA 
HUI  0.33  0.28 0.26  0.22  0.43 0.34  0.44  0.33 
IF  0.36  0.29 0.28  0.25  0.48 0.45  0.40  0.40 
SE  0.31  0.27 0.26  0.25  0.41 0.32  0.36  0.42 
NB 0.35  0.27  0.28  0.23 0.44  0.42  0.41  0.37 
RB  NA  NA NA  NA  NA NA  NA  NA 
HB 0.37  0.26  0.2  0.25 0.35  0.35  0.33  0.33 
Note: NA indicates not available. Spr. denotes  spring, Sum. Denotes summer. 
 
Dividing the RMSE by the mean of final GDP-growth outcomes which is 2.36 for the sample period 
one obtains the Theil V for the current forecasts. In order to get the Theil V for the year ahead forecasts 
one takes a ratio of RMSE to the mean of final outcomes for the period 1994-2001, which is 2.45. It’s 
astonishing that most of the Swedish GDP-growth forecasters outperform the Theil V counterpart 
which could be considered more sophisticated than the Theil U.  In Table 20 the results with respect to 
Theils U index are presented for CPI-inflation for both the current and next years forecasts. The results 
indicate that four out of seven forecasters are outperformed by the naive forecast for next years inflation 
projections. Nevertheless most of the CPI-inflation forecasters beat the Theil V naive model. Dividing 
RMSE by the mean of CPI one obtains the mean to be 1.80 and 1.43. All the forecasters outperform the 
naive model with respect to the unemployment variable. 
 
Our evaluation with respect to the TheilU-index indicates that the Swedish forecasters are good at 
forecasting unemployment and GDP-growth, in the sense of outperforming a naive model, but not as 
good as they are at forecasting the CPI-inflation. In order to evaluate the Theil V naive model divide 
RMSE by the mean of the actual of unemployment which is 6.42 and 6.20. All of the Swedish 
forecasters beat the naive Theil V model.  
 
5.6. Bias  
The test of bias is based on equation (4) which is equivalent to (1). The results of the bias in the GDP-
growth current and one year ahead forecasts are presented in Table 22 and Table 23. A forecast error 
that is larger than the actual outcome indicates a positive bias represented by a positive error term and 
vice versa. Merely IF have a negative bias in their year ahead autumn and December forecasts which is 
significant at 5% significance level. Most of the Swedish forecasters are under predicting GDP-growth 
outcomes. Almost all the GDP-growth forecasts for the current year are unbiased with the exception of 
IF. IF: s next years forecast is biased at 5% significant level. The results once again indicate negative 







Table 22. Test for bias in the GDP-growth (t), 1993-2001 
Inst Spring    Summer    Autumn    Dec    
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  Coeff. T-Stat Coeff  T-Stat  Coeff.  T-Stat Coeff  T-Stat 
NIER -0.36  0.90  -0.39  1.40 -0.18  1.02  -0.29 1.18 
FD -0.28 0.76  NA  NA  -0.21 1.14 NA  NA 
HUI -0.24 0.55  -0.30  0.72 -0.27  0.89  -0.30 1.19 
IF -0.80  1.80
  -0.69 2.08
** -0.62  2.26
**  -0.48 2.09
** 
SE -0.24 0.57  -0.22  0.68 -0.28  1.12  -0.22 1.57 
NB -0.50 1.30  -0.54  1.40 -0.41  1.25  -0.36 1.49 
RB -0.32 0.77  -0.31  0.84  -0.33 1.38  -0.38  1.79
 
HB 0.00 0.00 -0.21  0.53  -0.21 0.75  -0.22  1.19 
Note: NA indicates not available. Bias shows t-test values of the arithmetic average where ** denotes statistically 
significance on the 5% level. For d.f. =8, the 5% significance is t =1.86. For the two tailed test 5% significance is 
t = 2.31. 
 
According to Blix et al. (pp. 51), the underestimation of net exports significantly contributes to the 
downward bias for both the current and next-year GDP-growth forecasts. The test on bias based on (1) 
or (4) with 9 observations for the current year forecasts and 8 observations for the year ahead forecasts 
respectively. The results on bias indicate that most of the Swedish forecasters are unbiased, except for 
the I.F. For the current period CPI-inflation forecasts, contrary to the GDP-growth forecasts, we have 
positive bias. The forecasts are larger than the outcomes, implying that we are overestimating the CPI 
actual. In particular, HB, HUI, NB and SE’s CPI-inflation forecasts for the current period are biased 
and significant on the 5% level.  
 
Table 23. Test for bias in the GDP-growth year (t+1), 1994-2001 
Inst. Spring    Summer    Autumn    Dec   
  Coeff. T-Stat Coeff  T-Stat  Coeff.  T-Stat Coeff  T-Stat 
NIER -0.34  0.62  -0.23  0.46 -0.23  0.47  -0.31 0.58 
FD -0.40 0.81  NA  NA  -0.06 0.13 NA  NA 
HUI -0.54 0.96  -0.43  0.77 -0.16  0.30  -0.23 0.39 
IF -0.63  1.00
  -1.03 1.81 -0.77  1.41  -1.03  1.92
** 
SE -0.65 1.27  -0.35  0.68 -0.14  0.28  -0.15 0.28 
NB -0.63 1.00  -0.18  0.43 -0.16  0.34  -0.21 0.42 
RB -0.19 0.39  -0.19  0.40  -0.10 0.20  -0.24  0.43
 
HB -0.41 0.67  -0.44  0.71 -0.23  0.37  -0.10 0.16 
Note: NA indicates not available. Bias shows t-test values ** denotes statistically significance on the 5% level. For D.F. 





Table 24. Test for bias in the CPI-inflation (t), 1993-2001 
Inst Spring    Summer    Autumn    Dec    
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  Coeff. T-Stat Coeff  T-Stat  Coeff.  T-Stat Coeff  T-Stat 
NIER -0.05  0.24  0.02  0.29 0.04  0.66  -0.05 1.50 
FD -0.00 0.03  NA  NA  0.05 0.85 NA  NA 
HUI 0.46 1.54  0.29  2.22
** 0.14  1.22  -0.05 0.68 
IF 0.40  1.43 0.19  1.14  0.15 1.23  -0.05  1.13 
SE 0.24 1.08  0.23  1.99
** 0.06  2.11
** 0.08  1.05 
NB  0.02  0.06  0.09 0.51 0.11  1.97
** 0.05  2.25
** 
RB NA NA  NA  NA  NA NA  NA  NA 
HB 0.49  1.91
**  0.15 1.05 0.04  0.46  -0.02 1.50 
Note: NA indicates not available. Bias shows t-test values of the arithmetic average where ** denotes statistically 
significance on the 5% level. For d.f. =8, the 5% significance level is 1.86. For the two tailed test t test 5% significance 
level is t = 2.31. 
 
Looking at Table 25, six out of seven year ahead CPI-inflation forecasts are biased, at the statistically 
significant 5% level. NIER is the only CPI-inflation forecaster that is unbiased. According to Diebold et 
al. (1997) have found a tendency to under-estimate inflation during episodes of high inflation and over-
estimate it in period of low inflation. This seems to be the case for Sweden to a certain extent. The test 
for bias presented in Table 26 below, with respect to the unemployment variable for the current period 
forecasts indicates that bias is significant for NB, HB and IF at the 5% significance level. The 
unemployment rate is overestimated. Contrary to Blix et al., we do not find any statistical significant 
evidence of underestimation of the unemployment variable for FD. 
 
Table 25. Test for bias in the CPI-inflation (t+1), 1994-2001 
Inst. Spring    Summer    Autumn    Dec   
  Coeff. T-Stat Coeff  T-Stat  Coeff.  T-Stat Coeff  T-Stat 
NIER 0.52  1.44  0.42  1.27 0.43  1.16  0.33 1.04 
FD 0.70  2.20
** NA  NA  0.48 1.48  NA  NA 
HUI 1.10 2.79
** 0.73  2.24
** 0.75  2.41
** 0.53  1.59 
IF 0.88  2.54
** 0.92  2.54
** 0.80  1.81  0.43  1.28 
SE 1.18  2.85
** 1.23  4.32
** 0.96  3.13
** 0.76  2.73
** 
NB 0.82  2.01
** 0.84  2.28
** 0.66  1.67  0.46  1.22 
RB NA NA  NA  NA  NA NA  NA  NA 
HB 1.15  2.88
** 0.83  2.18
* 0.72  2.15  0.53 1.81 
Note: NA indicates not available. Bias shows t-test values of the arithmetic average where ** denotes  
statistically significance on the 5% level. For d.f. = 8, the 5% significance is t =1.86. For the two tailed  





Table 26. Test for bias in the UNP (t), 1993-2001 
Inst Spring    Summer    Autumn    Dec    
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  Coeff.  T-Stat  Coeff T-Stat Coeff.  T-Stat Coeff T-Stat 
NIER 0.34  1.78  0.32  1.45 0.30  1.36  0.28 1.59 
FD 0.37 1.78  NA  NA  0.25 1.16  NA  NA 
HUI  0.23  0.83  0.34 1.55 0.38  2.11  0.27 1.60 
IF  0.23  0.75  0.34 1.49 0.30  1.29  0.39  2.18
** 
SE  0.27  1.08  0.29 1.34 0.31  1.53  0.30 1.52 
NB 0.44 1.63  0.40  2.04
* 0.43  2.22
** 0.31  1.76 
RB NA NA  NA  NA  NA NA  NA  NA 
HB 0.14 0.44  0.30  1.45 0.31  1.41  0.33 1.78 
Note: NA indicates not available. Bias shows t-test values of the arithmetic average where ** denotes 5% significance. 
For d.f. =8, the 5% significance is t =1.86. For the two tailed test t test 5% significance level is t = 2.31. 
 
27. Test for bias in the UNP (t+1), 1994-2001 
Inst Spring    Summer    Autumn    Dec   
  Coeff. T-Stat Coeff  T-Stat  Coeff.  T-Stat Coeff  T-Stat 
NIER 0.56  1.60  0.36  1.12 0.35  1.03  0.17 0.72 
FD -0.08 0.26  NA  NA  0.05 0.14 NA  NA 
HUI  0.33  0.89  0.38 1.38 0.57  1.64  0.33 1.18 
IF 0.50  1.23 0.81 2.81
** 0.67  2.45
** 0.63  2.19
** 
SE  0.43  1.21  0.30 1.11 0.38  1.26  .0.41 1.14 
RB NA NA  NA  NA  NA NA  NA  NA 
NB  0.44  1.15  0.57 1.73 0.61  1.97
** 0.48  1.58 
HB  0.20  0.62  0.48 1.72 0.48  1.92
** 0.46  1.79 
Note: NA indicates not available. Bias shows t-test values of the arithmetic average where ** denotes 5% significance. 
For d.f. =8, the 5% significance is t =1.86. For the two tailed test t test 5% significance level is t = 2.31. 
 
The results of the year ahead unemployment forecasts indicates that HB, IF and NB forecasts are 
biased. They overestimate the unemployment variable.   
 
6. Conclusions 
The main objective of this study has been to assess the accuracy of the Swedish domestic forecasters 
with respect to GDP-growth, CPI-inflation and the unemployment variable. The measures of accuracy 
that have been employed are ME, MAE, RMSE, and directional accuracy. The results indicate: 
1). The average errors for a year ahead growth, inflation and unemployment are large in terms of both 
their variance and the importance of the variables. The Swedish forecaster’s performance is better at 
using preliminary than final GDP-growth outcomes. This can cause uncertainty in both the decision and 
policy making process. 
2). Accuracy measured by RMSE and MAE are significantly higher for growth than for CPI-inflation 
and unemployment. 
3). Directional accuracy analysis indicates that we are equally good /bad in predicting the directional 
accuracy for GDP-growth, CPI-inflation, and employment. The years that we are having problems in 
predicting GDP-growth are common to all the Swedish forecasters (1996, 1999, and 2000). Directional 
accuracy that was missed for CPI-inflation is (1996, 1998, and 1999). Lastly acceleration/deceleration  
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has been missed for the unemployment variable during the years (1994, 1995, and 1996). This is mainly 
due to a structural break in the unemployment variable. An important gauge of the forecasts ability to 
determine acceleration/deceleration is its success in maintaining directional accuracy. 
4). According to Theil U six out of seven Swedish CPI-inflation forecasters were not better than the 
naive alternative for CPI-inflation. Only one Swedish GDP-growth forecaster is outperformed by the 
naive alternative for GDP-growth. All Swedish forecasters were better than the naive alternative for the 
unemployment variable. All the Swedish forecasters beat the Theil V naive model. 
5).Tests of bias indicates that we underestimate GDP-growth, overestimate both CPI-inflation and 
unemployment. 
6). All the forecasters have been successful in predicting the downward trend in both CPI-inflation and 
unemployment. NIER could have as well let the current forecast be next years forecast and hence would 
have better forecasting accuracy. There is need to develop models helping to predict CPI-inflation. 
7). Looking at the figures for the GDP-growth forecasts and outcomes it seems that the Swedish 
forecasters do not capture all the acceleration/deceleration and the cycles under the period of this study 
1993-2001. This perhaps is the most important aspect of forecasting. 
8). GDP-growth revisions are positively biased.  
 
One would have expected a general improvement in accuracy over time, due to better knowledge of the 
economy and improved forecast techniques. Unfortunately this seems not to be the case. The results 
indicate that the forecasters are having problems with both forecasting important macro variables for 
year ahead forecasts. In addition the acceleration/deceleration was totally missed especially in context 
of the business cycle. Forecasting implies following the development in the Swedish economy and 
understanding the sources of fluctuations for central macro economic variables. The sources of the 
volatility in output, investment and employment is of domestic orgin while most of the fluctuations in 
export, import, current account, terms of trade and domestic interest rate come from abroad. 
 
In the early 1980 experience there was a broadly synchronized growth slowdown. The breadth of 
synchronization was surprising in light of the experience with international business business cycle 
linkages during the 1990s, when recessions occurred with noticeable differences in timing. The 
international transmission of disturbances will probably will be amplified by the increased financial 
market interdependence, since many disturbances influence not only demand but also financial market 
price. The volatility of GDP-growth, CPI-inflation and unemployment has increased substantially as the 
international business cycle has become more synchronized and there are leads and lags in the business 
cycles makes forecasting a challenge for forecasters who deal with a small open economy like Sweden. 
 
 There is a need to develop econometric models and leading indicators for the Swedish economy which 
could be a useful tool to aid the forecasters and complementary in providing an alternative to 
judgmental forecasting for the year ahead forecasts. In addition there is also a need improve the quality 
of national accounts which is under debate (see Öller and Hansson). There are also tools which can be 
used to predict booms and recessions like Markov- switching models. These factors outlined above 
indicate that macroeconomic forecasts leave room for considerable improvements. There is no single 
method or easy way to improve the quality of forecast. Problems in macroeconomic forecasting: can be 
due to short time series, data revisions, unreliable data, structural changes and weak inherent 
predictability (exchange and interest rates). In case the forecasts are generated from a model the 
forecasting errors can be large due to the (i). Uncertainty about the structure of the model. (ii). 
Uncertainty about the estimates of the model parameters. (iii) Finally due to the uncertainty about the 
data caused by revisions and the quality of the national accounts. 
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